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Abstract
Behavioral malware detection aims to improve on the
performance of static signature-based techniques used by
anti-virus systems, which are less effective against modern
polymorphic and metamorphic malware. Behavioral mal-
ware classification aims to go beyond the detection of mal-
ware by also identifying a malware’s family according to a
naming scheme such as the ones used by anti-virus vendors.
Behavioral malware classification techniques use run-time
features, such as file system or network activities, to capture
the behavioral characteristic of running processes. The in-
creasing volume of malware samples, diversity of malware
families, and the variety of naming schemes given to mal-
ware samples by anti-virus vendors present challenges to
behavioral malware classifiers. We describe a behavioral
classifier that uses a Convolutional Recurrent Neural Net-
work and data from Microsoft Windows Prefetch files. We
demonstrate the model’s improvement on the state-of-the-
art using a large dataset of malware families and four major
anti-virus vendor naming schemes. The model is effective
in classifying malware samples that belong to common and
rare malware families and can incrementally accommodate
the introduction of new malware samples and families.
1 Introduction and Background
Malware classification is the process of assigning a mal-
ware sample to a specific malware family. Malware within
a family shares similar properties that can be used to cre-
ate signatures for detection and classification. Signatures
can be categorized as static or dynamic based on how they
are extracted. A static signature can be based on a byte-
code sequence [24], binary assembly instruction [31], or an
imported Dynamic Link Library (DLL) [38]. Dynamic sig-
natures can be based on file system activities [18, 40], ter-
minal commands [43], network communications [26, 46],
or function and system call sequences [37, 20, 2].
Behavioral signatures have become a useful complement
to static signatures, which can be obfuscated easily and au-
tomatically [42]. For example, polymorphic and metamor-
phic malware mutate their appearance and structure with-
out affecting their behavior [41, 14]. Behavioral features
capture run-time information such as file system activities,
memory allocations, network communications, and system
calls during the execution of a program. Such features make
behavioral malware classifiers more resilient to static obfus-
cation methods.
Each anti-virus vendor has a unique labeling format
for malware families. The format often includes the tar-
get platform (e.g., Windows, Linux) the malware category
(e.g., trojan, worm, ransomware), and an arbitrary char-
acter that describes the generation. For example, a mal-
ware sample that belongs to the ransomware family Cerber
is labeled Ransom:Win32/Cerber.a according to the nam-
ing scheme in the Microsoft Windows Defender anti-virus
system. Such naming schemes are used to simplify the
classification of malware samples, track their evolution,
and associate their effective counter-response. The perfor-
mance of behavioral classification models depends on the
ground truth labels assigned by the various anti-virus nam-
ing schemes at training. Unfortunately, the naming schemes
are inconsistent across anti-virus vendors [35], which com-
plicates the training and evaluation process. This work de-
scribes a new malware classification model that performs
consistently better than other models described in previ-
ous work using various anti-virus ground truth labeling
schemes.
This paper presents our contributions to behavioral mal-
ware classification using information gathered from Mi-
crosoft Windows Prefetch files. We demonstrate that our
technique achieves a high classification score on common
malware families for a large number of samples. We mea-
sure the generalization of our malware classification model
on four different anti-virus scan engines. We demonstrate
the robustness of our model on rare malware families with
small sample sizes. We also evaluate the ability of our
model to include the correct malware family in its top pre-
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dictions. Finally, we present our model’s capacity to learn
the behavior of newly discovered malware samples and
families.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 explains
Microsoft Windows Prefetch files, which are used as dy-
namic features in our model. Section 2 describes previous
related work. Section 4 describes the architecture of our be-
havioral malware classification model. Section 5 explains
how the dataset used in the experiment was created from the
ground truth labelled data. Section 6 evaluates our model
against previous work on behavioral malware classification.
Finally, Section 7 outlines our conclusions and future work.
2 Related Work
Behavioral malware classification has been researched
extensively to mitigate the shortcomings of static malware
classification. Malware that use advanced obfuscation tech-
niques, such as polymorphism and metamorphism, are a
challenge for detection and classification using static anal-
ysis techniques [15, 29]. Researchers introduced new dy-
namic features to profile the behavior of malware samples.
They extract the program control graphs [25] and measure
the similarity between malware within the same family.
The work described in [36, 9, 20] used sequences of func-
tion/system calls to model the behavior of malware and ap-
plied machine learning techniques to group malware with
similar behavior into a common family.
The disparity between anti-virus vendors’ naming
schemes affect the performance of behavioral malware clas-
sifiers [3, 8, 21]. A common solution is to cluster malware
based on their observed behavior using unsupervised ma-
chine learning [3]. However, malware samples that are dif-
ficult to cluster are often left out [27]. A method to over-
come the disparity between anti-virus scan engine labels is
to cluster multiple ground truth labels into a single valid
ground truth source [34]. Another solution uses a method
to aggregate labels in conjunction with and supervised and
unsupervised machine learning techniques to infer suitable
labels [21].
Our work is distinct from previous efforts in that we
build a Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network that uses
new dynamic features extracted from Windows Prefetch
files to classify malware. The model should outperform pre-
vious work using any anti-virus labelling scheme, should
perform consistenly regardless of the ground truth labels,
and should be able to classify malware into both common
and rare malware families.
3 Microsoft Windows Prefetch Files
Prefetch files contain a summary of the behavior of Win-
dows applications. The Windows operating system uses
Prefetch files to speed up the booting process and launch
time of Windows programs. The Windows Cache Manager
(WCM) monitors the first two minutes of the booting pro-
cess and another sixty seconds after all systems services are
loaded. Similarly, WCM continues to monitor the applica-
tion running for ten seconds. The prefetching process ana-
lyzes the usage patterns of Windows applications while they
load their dependency files such as dynamic link libraries,
configuration files, and executable binary files. WCM stores
the information for each application in files with a .PF ex-
tension inside the system directory named Prefetch.
Prefetch files store relevant information about the behav-
iors of the application, which can be used for memory se-
curity forensics, system resources auditing, and Rootkit de-
tection [4, 30, 28]. Many malicious activities can leave dis-
tinguishable traces in Prefetch files [28, 30]. Even fileless
malware, which are memory resident malicious programs,
can leave residual trails in Prefetch files after deleting their
presence from the file system [13, 19, 7]. Poweliks is one
of the first fileless malware samples that can infect a com-
puter with Ransomware [19]. The malware employs eva-
sive techniques to avoid detection from traditional anti-virus
software.
Figure 1 shows an example Prefetch file for the
CMD.EXE program. The first section has runtime infor-
mation such as the last-execution timestamp. The second
section contains storage information. The third section lists
the directories accessed by the program. The final section
lists the resource files loaded by the program. The exact
format of Prefetch files may vary on different versions of
Windows, but the general structure is consistent across all
versions. In our model, we only use the list of loaded files
from the final section of each Prefetch file.
4 Malware Classification Model
Our model classifies malware into families using infor-
mation gathered from Prefetch files stored in the Windows
Prefetch folder. We use Convolutional Recurrent Neural
Networks to implement the components of our classifier.
This section describes the architecture of the model and the
training process used to create the model.
4.1 Model Architecture
Figure 2 shows the general architecture of our behav-
ioral malware classifier. The first layer is the embedding
layer. This layer receives a sequence of resource file names
and maps them to embedding vectors of arbitrary sizes. The
number of embedding vectors represents the size of the vo-
cabulary of the model. Each file name corresponds to a
unique embedding vector. Embedding vectors generally im-
prove the performance of large neural networks for complex
Figure 1: Example of a Prefetch file for the CMD.EXE pro-
gram
learning problems [33].
The second layer is a convolutional layer. The layer ap-
plies a one dimensional (1D) sequential filter of a particular
size. The layer, then, slides the filter over the entire list
to extract adjacent file names. This helps the model learn
the local relation between embedding vectors. 1D convolu-
tional layers have been used successfully in sequence clas-
sification and text classification [23] problems.
The third layer is Max Pooling. This layer reduces the
size of the data from the previous layer. It is designed to
improve the computational performance and the accuracy
of our model and its respective training process. We use the
maximum function to select the important representation out
of the data.
The fourth layer is Bidirectional LSTM. Bidirectional
LSTM (BiLSTM) is an architecture of recurrent neural net-
works [16]. Recurrent neural networks learn the long-term
dependency between the embedding vectors. In our con-
text, they model the relationship between the resources file
names loaded in each Prefetch file. The bidirectional struc-
ture consists of a forward and reversed LSTM, which is a
structure that has been successful in NLP and sequence clas-
sification problems [45, 17].
The fifth layer is Global Max Pooling. This layer prop-
agates only relevant information from the sequence of out-
puts of BiLSTM. It reduces the size of the output of the
Type Size Malware Family Samples
Adware 0.79% MultiPlug, SoftPulse, DomaIQ
Backdoor 2.25% Advml, Fynloski, Cycbot, Hlux
Trojan 89.18% AntiFW, Buzus, Invader, Kovter
Virus 1.44% Lamer, Parite, Nimnul, Virut
Worm 4.28% AutoIt, Socks, VBNA, Generic
Ransomware 2.07% Xorist, Zerber, Blocker, Bitman
Table 1: Malware types, size, and examples of malware
families according to the Kaspersky, EsetNod32, Microsoft,
and McAfee
BiLSTM layer.
The sixth, and final, layer is Softmax. This layer outputs
the probability that a malware sample belongs to a specific
malware family.
To improve the generalization of our model, we apply
different regularization techniques. First, we apply dropout
between our model layers. Dropout is a commonly used
technique in training large neural networks to reduce over-
fitting [39]. Dropout has shown to improve the training and
classification performance of large neural networks. The
goal is to learn hidden patterns without merely memorizing
the training samples in the training data. This improves the
robustness of the model on unseen (i.e., zero-day) malware
samples.
5 Experimental Setup
This section described how the dataset and the ground
truth labeling used in our experiment was created.
5.1 Dataset Collection
We successfully executed around 100,000 malware
samples obtained from the public malware repository
VirusShare1. Malware samples were deployed on freshly
installed Windows 7 executing on a virtual machine. Af-
ter each Prefetch file is collected, the virtual machine is re-
set to a clean (non-infected) state. In order for Windows
to generate a Prefetch file for malware sample, the sample
needs to be executed. Once the sample is loaded, Win-
dows generates a Prefetch file automatically. This simpli-
fies the task of extracting the Prefetch files for malicious
programs. Our experiments only included malware sam-
ples that produced Prefetch files and were identified by ma-
jor anti-virus engines, such as Kaspersky, EsetNod32, Mi-
crosoft, and McAfee.
1VirusShare2 http://www.virusshare.com
Figure 2: 1D-Conv-BiLSTM model architecture
5.2 Ground Truth Labeling
Ground truth labels for malware were obtained through
an online third-party virus scanning service called VirusTo-
tal3. Given an MD5, SHA1 or SHA256 of a malware file,
VirusTotal provides the detection information for popular
anti-virus engines. This information also includes meta-
data such as target platforms, malware types, and malware
families for each anti-virus scan engine. Table 1 illustrates
malware types, sample size, examples of malware fami-
lies according to EsetNod32, Kaspersky, Microsoft, and
MacAfee.
6 Evaluation
This section describes the experimental evaluation of our
model against a model from previous work.
6.1 Performance Measurements
The classification accuracy of our classification model is
measured by the F1 score, F1 demonstrates the trade-off be-
tween Recall and Precision and combines them into a sin-
gle metric range from 0.0 to 1.0. Recall is the fraction of
a number of retrieved examples over the number of all the
relevant examples. Precision is the fraction of the number
of relevant examples over the number of all retrieved ones.
The F1 score formula is:
F1 = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
A classifier is superior when its F1 score is higher. We
choose the F1 score because it is less prone to unbalanced
3VirusTotal, http://www.virustotal.com
classes in training data [11]. Malware training datasets of-
ten contain unbalanced samples for different malware fam-
ilies. The ratio between malware family sizes sometimes
varies 1:100. Table 2 shows malware type, size of malware
type, and a few examples of malware families.
6.2 Classification Performance with Com-
mon Malware Families
We evaluate our malware classification model against the
model of previous work on behavioral malware classifica-
tion [9]. The previous work examined multiple types of
feature extractions, feature selections, classification mod-
els based on large datasets extracted from sequences of OS
system calls. The top performing models were Logistic re-
gression (LR) and Random Forests (RF). LR and RF were
used with n-grams feature extraction and Term Frequency-
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) feature transforma-
tion [10]. RF also used Singular Value Decomposition
(SVD) for feature dimensionality reduction [22].
We implemented our new model using the Keras and
Tensorflow [12, 1] deep learning frameworks. We config-
ured our model using the following parameters:
• Embedding layer: 100 hidden units
• 1D Convolutional layer: 250 filters, kernel size of five,
one stride, and RELU activation function
• 1D Max Pooling: pool size of four
• Bidirectional LSTM: 250 hidden units
• L2 regularization: 0.02
• Dropout regularization: 0.5
• Recurrent Dropout regularization: 0.2
Anti-virus label (# of malware families)
Kaspersky (50) EsetNod32 (53) Microsoft (38) McAfee (55) F1 mean
1D-Conv-BiLSTM 0.734 0.854 0.754 0.765 0.777
LR 2-grams 0.711 0.821 0.734 0.756 0.756
LR 3-grams 0.718 0.822 0.726 0.756 0.756
RF 2-grams 0.702 0.792 0.731 0.755 0.745
RF 3-grams 0.671 0.699 0.72 0.724 0.704
Table 2: F1 score for 1D-Conv-BiLSTM, LR (2,3)-grams, and RF (2,3)-grams models using Kaspersky, EsetNod32, Mi-
crosoft, and McAfee labelings.
We implemented the previous work LR and RF models us-
ing Scikit-learn [32]. We applied a grid search to select the
best hyperparameters for the LR and RF models.
We train our model using Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) with batch size of 32 samples and 300 epochs [47].
SGD is an iterative optimization algorithm commonly used
in training large neural networks. SGD can operate on large
training sets using one sample or a small batch of samples
at a time. Thus, it is efficient for large training sets and for
online training [5].
We use a 10-fold cross-validation with stratified sam-
pling to create a balanced distribution of malware samples
for malware families in each fold. We train the models on
9 splits of our dataset and test on a separate dataset. We
repeat this experiment 10 times and take the average metric
score for the final output. We include any malware families
that have a minimum of 50 malware samples.
Table 2 shows the F1 score results of our experiment us-
ing four major anti-virus scan engines: Kaspersky, EsetN-
ode32, Microsoft, and MacAfee. The results show that our
model outperforms all other models using any anti-virus en-
gine labeling. The second best are the LR models, which
outperform the RF models on all anti-virus scan engines
and reproduce the results described in [9]. It is noteworthy
that the 3-gram features extraction usually provides better
results than the 2-gram features in the LR models. How-
ever, the 2-gram features outperform the 3-gram features in
the RF models.
As shown, the performance of behavioral classification
models depends on the anti-virus engine labelling scheme
used during training. LR 3-grams show a better per-
formance using the Kaspersky and EsetNode32 labelings,
while a worse performance using the Microsoft labeling
scheme. Moreover, RF 2-grams underperform all LR mod-
els except when using the Microsoft naming scheme. The
inconsistency of the results leads researchers to use the anti-
virus engine that produces the highest classification score.
However, our model shows consistent performance across
all major anti-virus engines and outperforms previous work
on major anti-virus engines.
6.3 Classification Performance with Rare
Malware Families
Rare malware families with small sample sizes repre-
sent a significant percentage of all malware families. This
presents a difficulty for models to extract useful behavioral
patterns due to insufficient samples during training. In this
experiment, we include any malware family that has at least
10 malware samples. This presents a challenge for clas-
sification models because the number of malware families
largely increases while, at the same time, the number of
malware samples for each family decreases. We aim to
show the robustness of our classification model when ap-
plied to rare malware families.
Table 3 shows the classification performance of our
model against LR and RF models using four anti-virus la-
beling schemes. The table shows that our model consis-
tently outperforms all other models despite the increased
number of malware families with a low sample size. For ex-
ample, on the EsetNod32 labeling scheme, our model per-
formance decreases only -1.0% when the number of fam-
ilies increases from 53 to 180 families while other mod-
els exhibit larger classification performance degradations.
Specifically, our model shows the smallest decrease in
the classification performance from any anti-virus labeling
scheme.
Figure 3 shows the average F1 scores of malware fam-
ilies for LR 3-grams, RF 2-grams, and 1D-Conv-BiLSTM
using EsetNod32 ground truth labels. We study the perfor-
mance of the behavioral classification models on individual
malware families to demonstrate the strength of the classi-
fication models on common and rare malware families. As
shown, the LR model struggles with rare malware families.
However, it outperforms the RF model when the number
malware samples in a family increases. Conversely, the RF
model performs reasonably on rare malware families, but it
underperforms the LR models on common malware fami-
lies. Ultimately, our 1D-Conv-BiLSTM model outperforms
both LR and RF models on almost all common and rare
malware families.
Anti-virus label (# of malware families)
Kaspersky (192) EsetNod32 (180) Microsoft (137) McAfee (209)
F1 Diff (%) F1 Diff (%) F1 Diff (%) F1 Diff (%) F1 mean Diff (%)
1D-Conv-BiLSTM 0.647 -0.088 0.844 -0.010 0.727 -0.027 0.720 -0.045 0.735 -4.25%
LR 2-Grams 0.586 -0.124 0.790 -0.032 0.656 -0.078 0.652 -0.104 0.671 -8.45%
LR 3-Grams 0.594 -0.124 0.790 -0.032 0.651 -0.075 0.656 -0.100 0.673 -8.28%
RF 2-Grams 0.588 -0.114 0.760 -0.031 0.664 -0.067 0.658 -0.097 0.668 -7.73%
RF 3-Grams 0.527 -0.144 0.650 -0.049 0.627 -0.093 0.587 -0.137 0.598 -10.58%
Table 3: F1 score for 1D-Conv-BiLSTM, LR (2,3)-grams, and RF (2,3)-grams models using Kaspersky, EsetNod32, Mi-
crosoft, and McAfee labelings. Diff (%) shows the change of the F1 scores from the previous section after adding rare
malware families.
Figure 3: Average F1 scores of the log number of malware
samples per family for 1D-Conv-BiLSTM, LR 3-grams,
and RF 2-grams using EstNod32 ground truth labels.
6.4 Top Predictions Performance
We also evaluated the capacity of the classification mod-
els to find the correct malware family label considering their
top k predictions. That is, how the F1 score improves when
the top [1,2,...,k] predictions include the correct malware
family label. As shown in Figure 4, 1D-Cov-BiLSTM con-
sistently outperforms all of the other models using the top
[1,2,...,25] predictions. 1D-Conv-BiLSTM achieves around
0.91, 0.95, and 0.99 F1 on the top 2, 5, and 25 predictions,
respectively. This demonstrates that the correct malware
family label is usually 99% within the top 25 predictions
of our model. The performance of the RF models vary be-
tween the (2,3)-grams models, while the LR models achieve
similar F1 scores between (2,3)-grams models using top
predictions.
The LR (2,3)-grams models outperform the RF models
up to the top 5 predictions. Then, the RF 2-grams model
outperforms the LR models on the top 5 or higher predic-
tions. The RF 3-grams model, which achieves the low-
Figure 4: The F1 scores for behavioral classification models
when top k predictions are used to find the correct malware
family label according to EsetNod32 ground truth labeling.
Figure 5: The F1 scores for newly trained and incremental
trained 1D-Conv-BiLSTM models on the test dataset during
training.
est classification performance in our experiment, matches
the corresponding LR model performance when consider-
ing the top 25 predictions. This shows that RF models have
a higher capacity to find the correct malware families within
the top candidates. The reason might be related to the fact
that a Random Forest is an ensemble of decision trees [6],
and it is knowns that ensemble models often overcome the
limitation of stand-alone classification models [44]. Our
model consistently outperforms the LR and RF models on
the top k predictions.
6.5 Classification Performance with New
Malware Families
Behavioral malware classification models need to learn
the behavior of newly discovered malware continuously.
This presents a challenge since the rate of malware sample
discovery is high. Therefore, it is efficient, and practical,
incrementally to train an existing model rather than re-train
it from scratch on newly discovered samples. Incremental
training provides a practical solution to assimilate new mal-
ware behavioral information into the classification models
without impacting the classification performance.
In this experiment, we evaluate our pre-trained model’s
ability to learn the behavior of new malware samples
quickly. We train our model on all malware families that
were discovered from 2010-2016. Then, we add malware
families that were discovered in 2017 to the training dataset
and incrementally retrain the model to create a new classifi-
cation model. We aim to show that incrementally re-training
an existing model is more efficient and adaptive than train-
ing a new model from scratch.
Figure 5 shows the classification performance of our
models during training. The experiment shows that the in-
crementally re-trained model achieves a higher F1 at early
stages during training than the newly trained model. There-
fore, the training process can be shortened to reduce the
overhead of training on new malware samples. Moreover,
incremental re-training of our model is efficient and recom-
mended over fully re-training the model.
7 Conclusion
We introduce a new behavioral malware classification
model for the Microsoft Windows platform. Our model ex-
tracts features from the Windows Prefetch files. We show
the effectiveness of our classification technique on a large
malware collection and ground truth labels from 4 major
anti-virus vendors.
We also evaluate our models on rare malware families
with a small number of malware samples. Despite the
increasing number of malware families, our model still
outperforms other state-of-the-art models. Moreover, we
demonstrate our model’s ability to continuously learn the
behavior of new malware families, which reduces the time
and overhead of the training process.
In the future, we would like to improve our ground truth
labeling by combining all major scan engine labels to in-
crease the performance and robustness of our classification
model. We would also like to test our model on evolving
malware families over time.
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